Certificateless cryptography inherits a solution to the certificate management problem in public-key encryption from identity-based techniques, whilst removing the secret key escrow functionality inherent to the identity-based setting. Signcryption schemes achieve confidentiality and authentication simultaneously by combining public-key encryption and digital signatures, offering better overall performance and security. In this paper, we introduce the notion of certificateless signcryption and present an efficient construction which guarantees security under insider attacks, and therefore provides forward secrecy and non-repudiation.
INTRODUCTION
Certificateless cryptography inherits from identity-based techniques a solution to the certificate management problem in public-key encryption, yet it eliminates the need for a trusted authority with key escrow capabilities. * The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT. The information in this document reflects only the authors' views, is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability. A full version of this paper is available from the Cryptology ePrint Archive at eprint.iacr.org.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ASIACCS '08, March 18-20, Tokyo, Japan Copyright 2008 ACM 978-1-59593-979-1/08/0003 ...$5.00.
In identity-based cryptography an arbitrary bit-string representing a user's identity can be used as the encryption or verification public key. This means that public key certificates are not required. This feature, however, comes at the cost of introducing an all-powerful secret key issuing authority, which authenticates users and provides secret keys through a secure channel.
In certificateless cryptography key escrow is seen as an undesirable property, and user encryption and verification keys contain both a user identity and an unauthenticated public key. Similarly, user secret keys are constructed from two partial secrets: one coming from an identity-based trusted authority called the Key Generation Centre (KGC) and another one generated by the user. Since certificateless cryptography was introduced by Al-Ryiami and Paterson [1], numerous certificateless encryption and signature schemes, and variants thereof, have been proposed. However, the equivalent of public-key signcryption has not been considered in the certificateless setting.
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that captures a common practical scenario where one simultaneously requires confidentiality and non-repudiation. This should allow for improvements in the overall security and efficiency of the resulting cryptosystems. The security goals associated with signcryption are stronger than those provided by authenticated encryption, where data authenticity suffices. For this reason the security model for signcryption should capture insider attacks where a dishonest receiver, should not be able to forge a valid signcryption originating from another user. In less common scenarios one may also require forward secrecy, where a message sent by a legitimate user, cannot be decrypted even by an adversary which later is able to get hold of the sender's secret key.
Our Contribution: In this paper we introduce the notion of certificateless signcryption, define appropriate security models, and propose an efficient scheme which is provably secure against insider attacks in the random oracle model. The scheme presents stronger security properties than one might expect from its internal building blocks: by sharing randomness between encryption and signature modules not only we gain extra savings on computational and bandwidth load, but also we obtain strong insider security guarantees. In the full version of the paper, we also identify a problem in using a technique by Coron for tighter security reductions in public key signature proofs in the certificateless setting and propose a solution to overcome it.
RELATED WORK
When Al-Ryiami and Paterson introduced certificateless cryptography[1], the authors proposed an encryption scheme and briefly outlined a signature scheme and extensions of other public-key primitives to the certificateless scenario. A good survey of certificateless public-key encryption schemes and security models can be found in [4] . The certificateless signature scheme proposed in [1], which lacked a security proof, was later found to be vulnerable to key replacement attacks [5] . Other certificateless signature schemes have been proposed in recent years. We refer the work of Zhang et al. [8] , which proposes a certificateless signature scheme closely based on the identity-based signature scheme of Libert et al. in [7] . In the full version of this paper we also show that the security proof for this scheme is flawed.
Signcryption in the public-key setting was introduced by Zheng in [9] . A systematic study of the properties of the signcryption schemes resulting from the black-box composition of encryption and signature schemes was later presented by An et al. [2] . To the best of our knowledge, the concept of certificateless signcryption has not been previously addressed in literature. However, a closely related construction, which offers authenticated certificateless encryption functionality was proposed in [3] . The difference between authenticated encryption and signcryption is a subtle but significant one: insider attacks are not considered in the unforgeability game, which means that non-repudiation is not guaranteed. The security models in [3] are significantly weaker than the ones considered in this paper: they do not consider decryption on replaced keys and impose unreasonable restrictions on the adversary's adaptive behaviour.
BILINEAR GROUPS
We will use the following definition of bilinear groups. Definition 1. A bilinear group description Γ is a tuple (p, G, GT , e,P ) where G and GT are groups of order p with efficiently computable group laws; e : G × G → GT is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map; and P is a generator of G.
Not only do we require the discrete logarithm and computational Diffie-Hellman problems in the two groups to be intractable, but also the following problems.
Definition 2. Given a bilinear group description Γ, we say the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) assumption holds if the advantage Adv GBDH Γ (A, qDBDH) of any PPT adversary defined by the probability below is negligible
Here OΓ denotes a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman oracle which on input a four-tuple (aP, bP, cP, T ) outputs 1 if T = e(P, P ) abc and 0 otherwise. By q DBDH we denote the maximum number of queries that A asks its decision oracle.
Definition 3. Given a bilinear group description Γ, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the presence of a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman oracle (GDH ) holds in G if the advantage Adv GDH Γ (A, q DBDH ) of any PPT adversary defined by the probability below is negligible.
Here OΓ and qDBDH are as in the above definition.
CERTIFICATELESS SIGNCRYPTION
A certificateless signcryption scheme is defined by a 6-tuple of PPT algorithms.
Setup(1
κ ) The global set-up algorithm, which takes as input the security parameter 1 κ and returns the KGC's secret key Msk and global parameters params including a master public key Mpk and descriptions of message space M, ciphertext space C and randomness space R. This algorithm is executed by the KGC, which publishes params.
2. Extract-Partial-Private-Key(ID, Msk, params) An algorithm which takes as input Msk, params and an identifier string ID ∈ {0, 1} * representing a user's identity, and returns a partial secret key D. This algorithm is run by the KGC, after verifying the user's identity.
3. Generate-User-Keys(ID, params) An algorithm which takes an identity and the public parameters and outputs a secret value x and a public key PK. This algorithm is run by a user, who can use the secret value to construct a full private key. The public key is published without certification.
4. Set-Private-Key(D, x, params) A deterministic algorithm which takes as input a partial secret key D and a secret value x and returns the full private key S. Again, this algorithm is run by a user to construct the full private key.
The sincryption algorithm, on input of a message m ∈ M, sender's full private key S S , identity ID S and public key PK S , the receiver's identity IDR and public key PKR, the global parameters params and possibly some randomness r ∈ R, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c ∈ R or an error symbol ⊥.
The deterministic de-signcryption algorithm. On input of a ciphertext c, receiver's full private key SR, identity IDR and public key PKR, the sender's identity IDS and public key PK S and the global parameters params, this algorithm outputs a plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥.
In defining the security of certificateless signcryption we follow the common approach in literature where one does not consider attacks targeting signcryptions where the sender and receiver identities are the same. We discuss this issue further in the full version of the paper.
The security game that captures the confidentiality requirement is defined as follows:
Here m 0 and m 1 should be of equal length and ID * S and ID * R should be distinct. Parameter aux is the empty string when x = I and it is the KGC's secret key Msk when x = II. Key values passed to the signcryption algorithm are those resulting from the adversary's interaction with the relevant oracles at the moment the challenge is issued. Note it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the secret value corresponding to ID * S , if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide this value. Here, implicitly, the challenger continues to use Msk which could be unknown to the adversary.
The adversary has access to six oracles.
• Request Public Key: On input of an identity ID, this oracle returns the corresponding public key. If such a key does not yet exist, it is constructed using the Generate-User-Keys algorithm.
• Replace Public Key: On input an identity ID and a valid PK, this oracle replaces the public key associated with ID with PK.
• Extract Partial Secret Key: On input of an identity ID, this oracle returns a partial secret key DID for that identity, generated using the Extract-PartialPrivate-Key algorithm.
• Extract Private Key: On input of an identity ID, this oracle returns the (full) private key for that identity SID. If such a key does not yet exist, it is constructed using the appropriate algorithms. The adversary is not allowed to query this oracle on any identity for which the corresponding public key has been replaced. Additionally, the adversary is never allowed to call this oracle on the challenge identities ID * S and ID * R . To capture insider security, this restriction applies only to ID * R .
• De-signcrypt: On input of a ciphertext, a sender's identity and a receiver's identity, this oracle returns the result of running the Dsc algorithm on the ciphertext, the sender's public parameters, and the receiver's full private key. Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the receiver's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. The adversary is not allowed to query this oracle in the second stage of the game on c * under ID * S and ID * R , unless the public key PK * S of the sender or that of the receiver PK * R used to signcrypt m b has been replaced after the challenge was issued. We also disallow queries where ID R = ID S .
Additional oracle restrictions apply in each attack scenario
Type I Adversary (IND-oCCA-I) This scenario models an attacker which is a common user of the system and is not in possession of the KGC's secret key. This type of adversary is not allowed to extract the partial secret key for ID * R or ID * S if the public key of this identity has been replaced before the challenge ciphertext was issued. To capture insider security (iCCA), this restriction is lifted from ID * S . In our security analysis we use a weaker formulation of insider Type I adversaries which we refer to as insider Type I . Here the adversary is not allowed to extract the partial private key of ID * R at all. Type II Adversary (IND-oCCA-II) This scenario models an honest-but-curious KGC, against which we want to preserve confidentiality. For this type of adversary, the partial secret key extraction oracle is not necessary, as it can simply generate these keys itself using Msk. Additionally, this type of adversary is not allowed to replace the public key for ID * R or ID * S before the challenge is issued. To capture insider security (iCCA), this restriction is lifted from ID * S . In the full version of the paper we prove that if a certificateless signcryption scheme is IND-iCCA secure against Type II and Type I attackers then it is also IND-iCCA secure against Type I attackers.
The authenticity property required for certificateless signcryption schemes is captured by the following (strong) existential unforgeability security model.
where aux is the empty string when x = I and it is the master secret key Msk when x = II. For the unforgeability game, we define the adversary's advantage Adv
(A) as the following probability
where m
and ID * R should be distinct. We denote by L the list of inputs and the corresponding outputs in queries to the signcryption oracle which is described below. The entries of this list are of the form (m, ID S , PK S , ID R , PK R , c) where PK S and PK R are the public keys corresponding to the queried identities at the time the query is placed. The adversary has access to the same oracles as in the confidentiality game as well as an additional signcryption oracle. We describe the differences:
• Extract Private Key: Same as in the previous game, but an insider adversary is allowed to query this oracle only on ID * R , rather than on ID * S .
• De-signcrypt: We still disallow queries where ID R = IDS. Apart from this, there are no restrictions on calls to this oracle, although the adversary should provide the secret value for the receiver, in case the corresponding public key has been replaced.
• Signcrypt: On input of a message, a sender's identity and a receiver's identity, this oracle returns the result of running the signcryption algorithm on the message, the sender's full private key, and the receiver's public parameters. Note that, it is possible that the challenger is not aware of the sender's secret value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this case, we require the adversary to provide it. We also disallow queries where ID R = ID S .
Various attack scenarios are as follows
Type I Adversary (sUF-oCMA-I) This type of adversary is not allowed to extract the partial secret keys for ID * S or ID * R if the public keys for these identities have been replaced. To capture insider security (iCMA), this restriction is lifted from ID * R .
In our security analysis we use a weaker formulation of insider Type I adversaries which we refer to as insider Type I . Here the adversary is not allowed to extract the partial private key of ID * S at all.
Type II Adversary (sUF-oCMA-II) This type of adversary is not allowed to replace the encrypt/verify key for ID * S or ID * R . To capture insider security (iCMA), this restriction is lifted from ID * R . In the full version of the paper we prove that if a certificateless signcryption scheme is sUF-iCMA secure against Type II and Type I attackers then it is also sUF-iCMA secure against Type I attackers.
In the full version of the paper we prove the following. Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is IND-iCCA-I/II secure, in the RO model, under the assumption that the GBDH problem is intractable in the underlying bilinear group.
DISCUSSION
The proposed signcryption scheme is structured internally as an Encrypt-then-Sign construction using algorithms from [3] and [8] and sharing randomness between the two schemes. The encryption algorithm can be shown to be IND-CPA secure, whereas the signature algorithm is sUF-CMA secure.
The expected security of our construction, which follows from the work of An et al. [2] , is therefore IND-CCA security against outsider adversaries and full insider sUF-CMA security. It is interesting to note, however, that our scheme presents full insider security for confidentiality. This is due to the reuse of randomness between the encryption and signature components which intuitively prevents an insider adversary from being able to forge a valid signcryption from one for which it does not know the implicit randomness.
Randomness reuse also provides the usual efficiency gains. We are able to save a few exponentiations and one ciphertext element through this technique. Efficiency benefits also justify our choice of the GBDH problem in the security reduction. The gap oracle allows us to construct a consistent simulation without resorting to a generic transformation akin to that in [6] which would add an extra ciphertext element to the scheme and a costly consistency check in designcryption. As a final note on the efficiency of the scheme, we note that we could have based our construction on the certificateless encryption scheme in [1] . This would provide a small computational gain if one considered public key validity check could be pre-computed. However, this would imply reducing the scheme's security to the less standard variant of the GBDH problem used in [1] .
